Arthur R. Baxter, Jr. -- Indiana Attorney At Law

Indiana Supreme Court Monthly Wrap Up
April, 2006



In In The Matter of Anonymous, the Indiana Supreme Court issued a how-to guide for an out-of-state attorney seeking to gain temporary permission to represent a litigant in an Indiana case. The general rule is that an attorney must possess an Indiana law license to represent a party in an Indiana case. Out-of-state attorneys must follow the dictates of Indiana Rules for Admission to the Bar and Discipline of Attorneys, Rule 3. First, the out-of-state attorney must, in conjunction with a local attorney, file a petition with the trial court. Secondly, the out-of-state attorney must file a Notice with the Clerk of the Indiana Supreme Court and pay an admission fee. While the case is going on, the out-of-state attorney must also pay an annual registration fee. In Anonymous, the out-of-state attorney was disciplined by the Indiana Supreme Court for failing to supply the Notice and for failing to pay the appropriate fee.

In Trail v. Boys and Girls Clubs, the Indiana Supreme Court dealt with the sufficiency of a lawsuit that was filed by a former executive director of the Boys and Girls Clubs. The former executive director alleged in the lawsuit that he had been an excellent employee and had an employment contract with the Clubs that expired in 2001. He further alleged that in 2002, the board of directors of the Clubs extended employment to the former executive director for an indefinite period of time, but then certain members of the board later terminated him without cause. The former executive director claimed that the articles of incorporation and the “protocols” of the Clubs permitted only the full board to fire him. The Indiana Supreme Court, in reaffirming the employment at will doctrine, held that in the absence of “adequate independent consideration,” the presence of a provision in the articles of incorporation or protocols of a business do not create employment rights that were enforceable by a discharged employee. The Supreme Court also noted that there was no allegation that the other two exceptions to the employment at will doctrine applied: termination for exercising a clear statutory right or termination in violation of promissory estoppel doctrine.

The Trail case also decided an issue concerning the former executive director’s claim that members of the board defamed him when they promulgated a negative report about him to various other members of the board. The court first held that there was “publication” of the report because it was distributed to the other members of the board. Next, the court held that the board members were shielded from liability under the qualified privilege which protects communications made in good faith on any subject matter in which the party making the communication has an interest or in reference to which he has a duty if made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty, provided there is no excessive communication. The court also found that the former executive director failed to identify specifically what the board members said about him. The court dismissed his defamation claim.

Finally, the court, in Trail, also dismissed the former executive director’s claim that members of the board of directors engaged in tortious interference with his at-will employment. While acknowledging that, in theory, such an action is recognized, the court held that the former executive director failed to allege in his lawsuit that the board members were acting outside their official capacity in firing him.

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